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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
PEREMPTORY NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS) (REVISITED) AND
OTHER TOPICS: THE SEVENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
By Sean D. Murphy*
The International Law Commission (ILC) held its seventy-third session from April 18 to
June 3 and from July 4 to August 5, 2022 in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Dire Tladi (South
Africa). 1 This session was the final one of the quinquennium, which originally would have
occurred in the summer of 2021. (Since the Commission did not meet in the summer of 2020 due
to the outbreak of the <10>COVID-19<10> pandemic, 2 the 2020 and 2021 sessions were
postponed to 2021 and 2022 respectively.) Although the pandemic continued in 2022, the members
faced fewer health risks and travel difficulties; consequently, the Commission held its session with
almost all members physically present in Geneva, and just a few occasionally participating online
by means of Zoom.
During the seventy-third session, the Commission completed the second reading of two
topics: peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens); and protection of the
environment in relation to armed conflicts. The Commission completed a first reading of the topic
on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. Progress was also made in
developing draft guidelines on succession of states with respect to state responsibility and draft
conclusions on general principles of law. Additionally, the Commission’s study group on sea-level
rise in relation to international law continued its work, which focused this session on matters
relating to statehood and to the protection of persons affected by sea-level rise.
The Commission also added three topics to its agenda: settlement of international disputes
to which international organizations are parties; prevention and repression of piracy and armed
robbery at sea; and subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law. Further,
the Commission added to its long-term work program a topic on non-legally binding international
agreements.
One unusual aspect of the session was that the election of the membership for the next
quinquennium took place as originally scheduled in November 2021, but those elected will not
commence their terms until 2023.
I. PEREMPTORY NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (JUS COGENS)

*

Manatt/Ahn Professor of International Law, George Washington University, and member of the UN
International Law Commission.
1
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventy-Third Session, UN GAOR, 77th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 2, para. 3, UN Doc. A/77/10 (2022) [hereinafter 2022 Report]. This report and other
International Law Commission documents are available online at http://legal.un.org/ilc. In addition, UN documents
are generally available online at https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp.
2
See generally Sean D. Murphy, Effects of the <8>COVID-19<8> Pandemic on the Work of the International
Law Commission, 114 AJIL 726 (2020) [hereinafter Murphy, Effects of the <8>COVID-19<8> Pandemic].
1

The Commission completed the second reading of the topic on peremptory norms of
general international law (jus cogens), 3 based on a fifth report by the special rapporteur, Dire
Tladi,4 and on comments received from governments regarding the text and commentary adopted
at first reading in 2019.5 The outcome of this topic is 23 draft conclusions and an annex with
commentary. Relatively modest changes were made to the text of the draft conclusions and annex
that was adopted at first reading.
The title was expanded to be draft conclusions on identification and legal consequences of
peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), which is intended to more closely
delineate the scope and purpose of the topic.6 Consistent with Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 7 draft conclusion 3 defines a peremptory norm of general
international law (jus cogens) as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”8
The draft conclusion on the “nature” of jus cogens—which was criticized by some
governments for potentially creating new criteria for identifying a norm as jus cogens 9 —was
relocated to appear before, rather than after, the definition of jus cogens, thus emphasizing that it
is not providing further criteria for the definition. 10 Further the draft conclusion was slightly
restructured to disaggregate elements indicating the general origins and purpose of jus cogens
norms (to reflect and protect fundamental values) and elements indicating their general scope and
effect (universally applicable and hierarchically superior to other rules). As now formulated, draft
conclusion 2 provides: “Peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) reflect and
protect fundamental values of the international community. They are universally applicable and
are hierarchically superior to other rules of international law.”11
Draft conclusion 7 seeks to explain what is meant by the “[i]nternational community of
States as a whole.” At second reading, draft conclusion 7, paragraph 2, was revised to provide that
there must be acceptance and recognition not just by a very large majority of states, but “by a very
3

For the text of the draft conclusions and annex, see 2022 Report, supra note 1, at 11–16; for the draft
conclusions and annex with commentary, see id. at 16–89.
4
See International Law Commission, Fifth Report on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus
Cogens), UN Doc. A/CN.4/747 (Jan. 24, 2022) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Dire Tladi). For discussion of prior
work on this topic, see Sean D. Murphy, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters and Other Topics: The SixtyEighth Session of the International Law Commission, 110 AJIL 718, 730–31 (2016) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Eighth
Session]; Sean D. Murphy, Crimes Against Humanity and Other Topics: The Sixty-Ninth Session of the International
Law Commission, 111 AJIL 970, 988–90 (2017) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Ninth Session]; Sean D. Murphy,
Anniversary Commemoration and Work of the International Law Commission’s Seventieth Session, 113 AJIL 90,
100–03 (2019) [hereinafter Murphy, Seventieth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, Peremptory Norms of General
International Law (Jus Cogens) and Other Topics: The Seventy-First Session of the International Law Commission,
114 AJIL 68, 68–72 (2020) [hereinafter Murphy, Seventy-First Session].
5
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens): Comments and Observations Received from
Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/748 (Mar. 9, 2022) [hereinafter Peremptory Norms, Comments and Observations].
6
See Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), Statement of the Chair of the Drafting
Committee, Mr. Ki-Gab Park, at 2 (May 17, 2022),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/statements/2022_dc_chairman_statement_jc.pdf [hereinafter
Peremptory Norms, Statement of the Chair of the Drafting Committee].
7
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969)
[hereinafter VCLT].
8
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 12 (draft conclusion 3).
9
Peremptory Norms, Comments and Observations, supra note 5, at 21–26.
10
See Peremptory Norms, Statement of the Chair of the Drafting Committee, supra note 6, at 2–3.
11
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 11 (draft conclusion 2).
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large and representative majority of States.” 12 The commentary indicates that the term
representative “requires that the acceptance and recognition be across regions, legal systems and
cultures.”13 Yet the commentary does not go further so as to explain whether, for example, a norm
must be accepted and recognized as nonderogable across each of the principal regions (Africa,
Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North America, and South America), across each of the principal
legal systems (e.g., civil, common law, and Islamic law), and across all cultures (presumably not
in the sense of each state having its own culture).
A high degree of acceptance and recognition may also be observed in other aspects of the
commentary adopted at second reading. For example, the commentary to draft conclusion 14 notes
that “if a rule of customary international law was the object of persistent objections from several
States, such objections might not be sufficient to preclude the emergence of a rule of customary
international law, but might be sufficient to preclude the norm from being recognized as a
peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens).”14 In other words, the standard for
recognition of a rule as a jus cogens norm may be even higher than that for the identification of a
rule of customary international law. Separately, the forms of evidence of such acceptance and
recognition were slightly amended in draft conclusion 8, paragraph 2, to make clear that
“resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference” were
pertinent as a form of “conduct of States.”15
Part Three sets forth a series of draft conclusions indicating that certain rules of
international law are void or terminate if in conflict with jus cogens. Aware that it is destabilizing
to the international legal system for any state to decide unilaterally whether its legal obligations
conflict with jus cogens, Part Four identifies two guard rails. First, draft conclusion 20 indicates
that where there appears to be a conflict between jus cogens and another rule of international law,
“the latter is, as far as possible, to be interpreted and applied so as to be consistent with the
former.”16 Second, if such conflict cannot be avoided, draft conclusion 21 addresses procedural
steps whereby the state invoking jus cogens as a ground for invalidity or termination gives notice
to any affected states, negotiations ensue if any of those states object, and the matter is submitted
to the International Court of Justice if no other solution can be reached. While such procedures fit
well within a treaty, such as the VCLT,17 and may well be good practice, it is difficult to maintain
that they are obligatory as a matter of customary international law, and governments criticized the
first reading text on that basis.18 In response at second reading, the title of the draft conclusion was
changed from “Procedural requirements” to “Recommended procedure” and various verbs were
changed from “shall” to “should.”19 The bottom line, however, is a Commission position that states
should not unilaterally declare that rules binding upon them are void due to jus cogens; any such
position should be approached through a process of negotiation and, if necessary, dispute
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Id. (draft conclusion 7) (emphasis added).
Id. at 40, para. (8) (commentary to draft conclusion 7).
14
Id. at 60, para. (12) (commentary to draft conclusion 14).
15
Id. at 13 (draft conclusion 8, para. 2) (“… resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an
intergovernmental conference; and other conduct of States.”) (emphasis added); see Peremptory Norms, Statement
of the Chair of the Drafting Committee, supra note 6, at 11 (“In the end, the Drafting Committee adopted the
proposal of the Special Rapporteur to include a more all-encompassing reference to State conduct … .”).
16
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 15 (draft conclusion 20).
17
See VCLT, supra note 7, arts. 65–67.
18
Peremptory Norms, Comments and Observations, supra note 5, at 90–98.
19
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 15–16 (draft conclusion 21).
13
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settlement. Moreover, “the invoking State should not carry out the measure which it has proposed
until the dispute is resolved.”20
Two issues that engendered considerable reactions from governments or within the
Commission were addressed solely by the commentary. The first concerned the potential adverse
effects of draft conclusion 16—which provides that a binding resolution of an international
organization does not create obligations under international law if it conflicts with jus cogens—on
the authority of the U.N. Security Council. Several states supported draft conclusion 16 and viewed
it as appropriate that Security Council resolutions are covered. 21 Several other states, however,
regarded the Council as being in a special position, given the agreement by all states to U.N.
Charter Chapter VII and article 25, and especially given the hierarchy established by article 103.22
At second reading the commentary to draft conclusion 16 was augmented with the following text:
The application of the rule in draft conclusion 16 has to be read together with the
interpretative rule set out in draft conclusion 20 and the procedures laid out in draft
conclusion 21. While the procedural rules laid out in draft conclusion 21 apply also to other
sources of obligations, these are particularly important in relation to resolutions of the
United Nations adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Draft
conclusion 16 should therefore not be read as providing cover for unilateral repudiation of
obligations flowing under binding resolutions of the United Nations. Indeed, while the
commentary states that Security Council resolutions are covered by draft conclusion 16,
the Commission is conscious that it is highly unlikely that a Security Council resolution
would, on its face, be in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus
cogens). Thus, in the first place, before determining that there is a conflict between a
Security Council decision and a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens),
the rule of interpretation contained in draft conclusion 20 should be applied in order to
avoid, where possible, such a conflict. Second, prior to adopting any measure on the
strength of a belief that a binding Security Council resolution is in conflict with a
peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens), a State should follow the
procedure set forth in draft conclusion 21.23
The second issue concerned draft conclusion 19, which provides in part that “States shall
cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach by a State of an obligation
arising under” jus cogens. While some states supported this draft conclusion, others viewed it as
unclear,24 as needing further support,25 or as not reflecting existing law,26 particularly noting that
20

Id. at 16 (draft conclusion 21, para. 3).
For reactions by states to this draft conclusion, see Peremptory Norms, Comments and Observations, supra
note 5, at 74–80.
22
Chapter VII empowers the Council to adopt decisions to address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace
and acts of aggression, including economic sanctions and authorizations to use military force. Article 25 provides:
“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter.” Article 103 provides: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”
23
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 64, para. (5) (commentary to draft conclusion 16) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
24
See, e.g., Peremptory Norms, Comments and Observations, supra note 5, at 84 (Colombia).
25
See, e.g., id. at 84 (Australia); id. at 87 (Netherlands).
26
See, e.g., id. at 85 (Israel).
21
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the sources cited usually made no reference to jus cogens. 27 In all likelihood, the concerns
expressed (which were also expressed when comparable provisions appeared in the 2001 draft
articles on the responsibility of states for international wrongful acts 28) relate to an apprehension
that states are being told they are obligated to take affirmative, but undefined, steps to “bring to an
end” any serious breach of jus cogens, including acts of racial discrimination or trafficking in
persons. Rather than soften the draft conclusion, the Commission at second reading essentially
doubled-down on the proposition, maintaining the text of the draft conclusion unchanged, while
adding references to a large number of General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions
that purportedly “illustrate the duty to cooperate to bring to an end serious breaches” of jus
cogens, 29 such as General Assembly resolution ES-11/3 suspending the Russian Federation
membership from the Human Rights Council in the wake of its invasion of and apparent atrocities
in Ukraine.30 Leaving aside that such resolutions nowhere mention jus cogens, the commentary
also does not assess the significance of the vote count in such resolutions (for example, ES-11/3
was adopted by a vote of 93-24 with 58 abstentions), and whether voting against or abstaining on
such resolutions casts doubt that the obligation in draft conclusion 19 is widely accepted by states,
or whether such voting constitutes a violation of the asserted obligation to cooperate. As it happens,
the special rapporteur proposed two new paragraphs to this commentary that would have referred
in depth to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine but, after debate, it was decided by the Commission
simply to include references to resolutions concerning that intervention alongside the numerous
other resolutions concerning other incidents.31
The Commission decided to recommend that the General Assembly take note of the draft
conclusions, annex them to a resolution, ensure their widest possible dissemination, and commend
them to “the attention of States and to all who may be called upon” to deal with the subject.32
II. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN RELATION TO ARMED CONFLICTS
The Commission also completed the second reading of the topic on protection of the
environment in relation to armed conflicts,33 based on a third report by the special rapporteur,
27

Japan observed that:
in the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from
Mauritius in 1965, the International Court of Justice stated that all Member States are under an obligation
to cooperate with the United Nations in order to complete decolonization, without referring to jus cogens.
Similarly, according to the advisory opinion of Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, “all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation
resulting from the construction of the wall”, but there was no explicit reference to jus cogens.
Id. at 87 (citation omitted); see also id. at 86 (Italy) (“In fact, both advisory opinions grounded the identification of
legal consequences for third parties on the erga omnes nature of the obligations breached, rather than on the
peremptory nature of the corresponding norm and/or the serious violation of those obligations/norms.”).
28
See, e.g., id. at 89 (United Kingdom).
29
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 73–74, para. (9) (commentary to draft conclusion 19).
30
G.A. Res. ES-11/3 (Apr. 8, 2022) (cited at 2022 Report, supra note 1, at 74, n. 251).
31
See International Law Commission, Provisional Summary Record of the 3599th Meeting, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3599 at 7–12 (July 26, 2022); International Law Commission, Provisional Summary Record of the
3600th Meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3600 at 7–10 (July 27, 2022); International Law Commission, Provisional
Summary Record of the 3601st Meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3601 at 6–8 (July 27, 2022). These summary records
may be accessed at https://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/73/docs.shtml.
32
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 11, para. 41.
33
For the text of the draft principles, see 2022 Report, supra note 1, at 92–96; for the draft principles with
commentary, see id. at 96–187.
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Marja Lehto (Finland), 34 and on comments received from governments, international
organizations and others regarding the text and commentary adopted at first reading in 2019.35 The
outcome of this topic is a preamble and 27 draft principles with commentary. Among the various
sources cited in the commentary to this topic are military manuals, 36 review mechanisms,37 and
treatises38 developed by the United States for the regulation of its armed forces, as well as U.S.
laws, case law, and practice, 39 including that relevant to corporate activity harmful to the
environment in conflict areas.40
There was no preamble to these draft principles at first reading, but elements for one were
proposed by the special rapporteur and then developed in the drafting committee.41 Among other
things, the draft preamble recalls principle 24 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, 42 which provides inter alia that states shall “respect international law providing
protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development,
as necessary.” 43 Further, the draft preamble notes the connection between the environmental
consequences of armed conflict and other global environmental challenges, such as climate change
and biodiversity loss. 44 No doubt when adopting the draft preamble, ILC members had in mind
recent events in Ukraine, where armed conflict raised the possibility of radioactive contamination
from the dormant Chernobyl nuclear site and from active nuclear power plants, and other forms of
environmental harm.45
As was the case at the first reading, the draft principles are structured in five parts
addressing: introduction (draft principles 1-2); principles of general application (3-11); principles
applicable during armed conflict (12-18); principles applicable in situations of occupation
34
International Law Commission, Third Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed
Conflicts, UN Doc. A/CN.4/750 (Mar. 16, 2022) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Marja Lehto) [hereinafter Third
Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts]. For discussion of prior work on these draft
principles, see Sean D. Murphy, Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The
Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 108 AJIL 41, 55–56 (2014) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Fifth
Session]; Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens (Revisited) and Other Topics: The Sixty-Sixth Session of the
International Law Commission, 109 AJIL 125, 143 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session]; Sean D. Murphy,
Identification of Customary International Law and Other Topics: The Sixty-Seventh Session of the International Law
Commission, 109 AJIL 822, 838–41 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Seventh Session]; Murphy, Sixty-Eighth
Session, supra note 4, at 731–32; Murphy, Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 4, at 992; Murphy, Seventieth Session,
supra note 4, at 103–04; Murphy, Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, at 72–75.
35
See Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Comments and Observations Received
from Governments, International Organizations and Others, UN Doc. A/CN.4/749 (Jan. 17, 2022).
36
See, e.g., 2022 Report, supra note 1, at 102, n.349; 143, n.642; 147, n.663; 156, n.723; 161, n.750.
37
See, e.g., id. at 103, n.354.
38
See, e.g., id. at 112–14, paras. (3)–(4).
39
See, e.g., id. at 140, n.618 (citing to the Paquete Habana case on principles of humanity in time of war).
40
See, e.g., id. at 127, n.519; 133, para. (5); 134, n.574; 181–82, paras. (2)–(3).
41
Third Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, supra note 34, at 104–06,
paras. 308–11.
42
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 92, pmbl. cl. 2.
43
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992, vol. I, Resolutions adopted by the Conference
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigendum; A/CONF/151/26/Rev.1 (vol. I) and Corr.1),
resolution 1, annex I, p. 7, principle 24.
44
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 92, draft pmbl. cl. 3.
45
See, e.g., OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Ukraine: Current status of nuclear power installations, available at
https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_66130/ukraine-current-status-of-nuclear-power-installations (last visited Oct. 28,
2022).
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(principles 19-21); and principles applicable after armed conflict (22-27). Relatively modest
changes were made from the first reading text, but four bear noting.
First, while draft principle 5, paragraph 1, previously provided that “States should” take
appropriate measures, in the event of armed conflict, to protect the environment of indigenous
peoples, it now reads that “States, international organizations and other relevant actors shall” take
such measures. The oscillation between the use of “shall” and “should” in the draft principles, here
and elsewhere, is not explained in the commentary, and appears simply to reflect little more than
preferences within the Commission. Thus, the commentary to draft principle 5, paragraph 1, does
not provide any indication of why the change was made, nor does it provide any legal support for
an international obligation of international organizations or other relevant actors to protect the
lands and territories of indigenous peoples in the event of armed conflict. 46 The lack of such
support in commentary may be suggestive of an effort to progressively develop the law rather than
its codification.
Second, at first reading, draft principle 9 on “State responsibility” synthesized the basic
obligation of a state for an internationally wrongful act, albeit in relation to an armed conflict.47
At second reading, a second paragraph was added saying that the draft principles were without
prejudice to the rules on the responsibility of states or of international organizations for
internationally wrongful acts.48 The addition of this second paragraph seems to neutralize any
potential significance of the first paragraph, by essentially saying that the reader must revert to the
general rules on state responsibility to address such responsibility in this context. Indeed, the
commentary explains that the “purpose of the saving clause is to make it clear that the draft
principles do not deviate from the rules of State responsibility as codified by the Commission’s
articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.”49 A third paragraph was also
added, this time saying that the present draft articles were without prejudice to (a) the rules on the
responsibility of non-state armed groups; and (b) the rules on individual criminal responsibility.50
Here, the commentary notes that these aspects concern a different area of international law, where
the law is “less settled.”51
Third, draft principle 13 on “General protection of the environment during armed conflict”
contains a restructured and expanded paragraph 2. That paragraph now reads that, “[s]ubject to
applicable international law: (a) care shall be taken to protect the environment against widespread,
long-term and severe damage; (b) the use of methods and means of warfare that are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment is
prohibited.” The opening chapeau “[s]ubject to applicable international law” is meant to
acknowledge that there are at issue treaty obligations with differing application (including that
some states have not ratified Protocol I and that some who have did so subject to relevant
declarations), and differing views regarding whether those treaty obligations have acquired a
customary status.52 That said, subparagraphs (a) and (b) are “inspired” by Protocol I articles 35,
paragraph 3, and 55, paragraph 1.53

46

2022 Report, supra note 1, at 108-10, paras. (1)–(8) (commentary to draft principle 5).
Id. at 93 (draft principle 9, para. 1).
48
Id. at 93 (draft principle 9, para. 2).
49
Id. at 124, para. (10) (commentary to draft principle 9).
50
Id. at 93, draft principle 9, para. 3.
51
Id. at 125, para. (12) (commentary to draft principle 9).
52
Id. at 141–43, paras. (6)–(9) (commentary to draft principle 13).
53
Id. at 141, para. (5) (commentary to draft principle 13).
47
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Fourth, the first reading text contained a draft principle that was dropped at second reading,
at the suggestion of the special rapporteur. It provided: “Environmental considerations shall be
taken into account when applying the principle of proportionality and the rules on military
necessity.” 54 In reviewing the first reading text, several states and the ICRC found the draft
principle unclear, vague, redundant, or in potential conflict with other draft principles, and urged
its deletion or merger into other principles.55 The special rapporteur recommended deletion and
incorporation into commentary, as appropriate, any useful elements relating to this draft
principle.56 The concept of “military necessity” was also removed from draft principle 14,57 due
to criticisms received from states and the ICRC, which essentially argued that the concept operated
at a high level of generality (similar to the principle of humanity), and informs but is not itself a
specific rule (as compared with rules on distinction or proportionality).58
The Commission decided to recommend that the General Assembly take note of the draft
principles, annex them to a resolution, encourage their widest possible dissemination, and
commend them “to the attention of States, international organizations and all who may be called
upon to deal with the subject.”59
III. OTHER TOPICS ADDRESSED DURING THE SEVENTY-THIRD SESSION
A. Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
The topic on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, which
commenced in 2007, remains the longest one on the current program of work of the Commission.60
No report was submitted at the present session by the special rapporteur, Concepción Escobar
Hernández (Spain), but based on prior reports, the Commission completed a first reading of the
topic, consisting of 18 draft articles and an annex with commentary.61
The principal work in the drafting committee concerned completion of a series of proposals
for “[p]rocedural provisions and safeguards,” found at draft articles 8 to 18.62 These detailed draft
articles now make up the bulk of the project, both numerically and in terms of length. One overall
observation is that the commentary to these draft articles, while explaining the Commission’s own
54

See Third Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, supra note 34, at 112
(proposal to delete principle 15 as it appeared in the first reading text).
55
Id. at 64–65, paras. 173–77.
56
Id., at 65, para. 178.
57
Draft principle 14 now reads: “The law of armed conflict, including the principles and rules on distinction,
proportionality and precautions shall be applied to the environment, with a view to its protection.” 2022 Report,
supra note 1, at 94.
58
See Third Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, supra note 34, at 61,
para. 164.
59
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 91, para. 55.
60
For discussion of prior work on this topic, see Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens and Other Topics:
The Sixty-Fourth Session of the International Law Commission, 107 AJIL 164, 169−71 (2013); Murphy, Sixty-Fifth
Session, supra note 34, at 41–48; Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session, supra note 34, at 139–40; Murphy, Sixty-Seventh
Session, supra note 34, at 842; Murphy, Sixty-Eighth Session, supra note 4, at 732−42; Murphy, Sixty-Ninth Session,
supra note 4, at 981–88; Murphy, Seventieth Session, supra note 4, at 106; Murphy, Seventy-First Session, supra note
4, at 81–82; Sean D. Murphy, The Provisional Application of Treaties and Other Topics: The Seventy-Second Session
of the International Law Commission, 115 AJIL 671, 677–79 (2021) [hereinafter Murphy, Seventy-Second Session].
61
For the text of the draft conclusions and annex, see 2022 Report, supra note 1, at 189–94; for the draft
conclusions and annex with commentary, see id. at 194–286.
62
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 191–94.
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reasoning as to why they are drafted the way that they are, provides little support from state practice
that governments at present actually follow these provisions and safeguards. This may be
suggestive that the draft articles as a whole are not codifying settled state practice with opinio juris,
but instead are proposing new rules that states may wish to adopt, perhaps by means of an
international convention.
In any event, the initial draft articles on procedural provisions and safeguards concern the
steps to be taken by the competent authorities of a forum state who become aware that an official
of another state may be affected by the forum state’s criminal jurisdiction, and ways in which the
state of the official may thereafter react.63 The forum state is expected to: examine the question of
the official’s immunity without delay and before initiating criminal proceedings or taking coercive
measures (draft article 9); then notify the state of the official before initiating such proceedings or
measures (draft article 10); if the state of the official invokes immunity, the forum state shall
immediately inform any of its authorities concerned (draft article 11); if the state of the official
waives immunity, which must be express and in writing, that too should be communicated
immediately to the relevant forum state authorities (draft article 12); and either state may request
information from the other as necessary to decide on such matters (draft article 13). It remains to
be seen whether states will react favorably to an obligation not to take any coercive measures
against the state official until after notifying the official’s state, given that there may exist concerns
about flight of the official from the forum state.
Ultimately, the forum state must then determine whether immunity exists (draft article 14),
and that determination must take into account certain factors (paragraph 2). Further, if the forum
state is invoking draft article 7 (on six specified crimes under international law in respect of which
immunity ratione materiae shall not apply), 64 then additional factors must also be considered
(paragraph 3). The relevant paragraphs read:
2.
In making a determination about immunity, such competent authorities shall
take into account in particular:
(a) whether the forum State has made the notification provided for in draft
article 10;
(b) whether the State of the official has invoked or waived immunity;
(c) any other relevant information provided by the authorities of the State
of the official;
(d) any other relevant information provided by other authorities of the
forum State; and
(e) any other relevant information from other sources.
63
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3. When the forum State is considering the application of draft article 7 in making
the determination of immunity:
(a) the authorities making the determination shall be at an appropriately
high level;
(b) in addition to what is provided in paragraph 2, the competent authorities
shall:
(i) assure themselves that there are substantial grounds to believe that the
official committed any of the crimes under international law listed in draft
article 7;
(ii) give consideration to any request or notification by another authority,
court or tribunal regarding its exercise of or intention to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over the official.65
Thereafter, the procedural provisions and safeguards address the possibility of transfer of
the criminal proceedings from the forum state to the state of the official (draft article 15), inter
alia, providing that the forum state “shall consider in good faith a request for transfer of the
criminal proceedings,” but such “transfer shall only take place if the State of the official agrees to
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”66 Draft article 16
addresses the fair treatment of the state official and expresses an entitlement of the official to
communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the state of the official
(analogous to the right of a foreign national to communicate with a consular official), even if the
official is not a national of that state.67 Draft article 17 provides that the two states shall consult,
as appropriate, while draft article 18 contains rules on dispute settlement. After pursuing
negotiation or other means for resolving the dispute for a “reasonable time, the dispute shall, at the
request of either the forum State or the State of the official, be submitted to the International Court
of Justice…” (again, perhaps suggesting that the draft articles are intended to form part of an
eventual convention).68
In her eighth report on this topic,69 the special rapporteur had examined the relationship
between the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction and international
criminal tribunals,70 and in particular considered the judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Court in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir case.71 Among other things, the
special rapporteur noted that “the assessment made of the judgment from different academic
65
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positions and by some States and the Court itself has not been kind.”72 Ultimately, the Commission
adopted a new paragraph 3 to draft article 1, which provides: “The present draft articles do not
affect the rights and obligations of States Parties under international agreements establishing
international criminal courts and tribunals as between the parties to those agreements.”73 Among
other things, the commentary notes that “issues relating to immunity before international criminal
courts and tribunals remain outside the scope of the present draft articles, as such issues are
governed by a legal regime of their own.”74
The draft articles were adopted by the Commission on first reading without a vote, as is its
normal practice. However, at the time of the adoption, “some members recalled that they had voted
against draft article 7 in 2017, setting out their reasons in explanations of vote, and stated that the
fact that no vote had taken place in 2022 did not mean that either the law or their legal positions
had in any way changed.”75 The members who voted against draft article 7 in 2017 regarded it as
not reflecting existing international law (or as desirable law for the future), as it could pose a risk
to peaceful relations between states and rested on only a handful of national laws and cases, and
no multilateral treaties or other forms of State practice supporting such exceptions, while many
treaties, national laws and cases pointed in the opposite direction. They noted that draft article 7
was not being characterized as a proposal for new law in the special rapporteur’s report or the
statement of the chair of the drafting committee, an approach that might have allowed for
consensus.76 In any event, in 2022 no changes were made to draft article 7 or the associated annex,
while only modest changes were made to their respective commentaries.77
B. Succession of States in Respect of State Responsibility
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In 2016, the Commission moved the topic of succession of states in respect of state
responsibility onto the current program of work and appointed Pavel Šturma (Czech Republic) as
special rapporteur. Generally speaking, this topic is analyzing the rules on state responsibility
applicable to the rights and obligations of a predecessor state, a successor state, and third states, in
situations where a succession of states occurs.78 At the present session, the Commission had before
it the fifth report of the special rapporteur, which examined the question of a plurality of injured
successor states and a plurality of responsible successor states, but it made no proposals in that
regard.79 The report, however, did propose a renumbering and restructuring of previously adopted
or proposed draft articles.80
In the course of the debate in the Commission on the fifth report, “[s]everal members
questioned whether the development of draft articles was the most appropriate outcome,
particularly in light of concerns expressed by some States in the Sixth Committee, throughout the
course of the Commission’s work on the topic, as to the relative paucity of State practice
available … .”81 Ultimately, the Commission decided to instruct the drafting committee to proceed
on the basis of the provisions taking the form of “draft guidelines” instead of “draft articles.”82
This change in form, however, was not explained by the Commission in its report; to the extent
that draft articles might be recommended to the General Assembly as a basis for a convention, the
degree of practice supporting the draft articles is not necessarily important. The retreat to a
statement of “guidelines” might signal a lack of confidence by the Commission in the utility of the
provisions, which continue to try to mediate between the polar extremes of “automatic succession”
and “clean slate.”
In any event, the Commission had hoped to complete a first reading of this topic at the
present session, especially given that the special rapporteur would not be returning in the next
quinquennium. It was unable to do so but did provisionally adopt eleven draft guidelines. An
example of such a draft guideline (and of the utility of these provisions) is draft guideline 10 on
“Uniting of States,” which reads: “When two or more States unite and so form one successor State,
and an internationally wrongful act has been committed by any of the predecessor States, the
injured State and the successor State should agree on how to address the injury.”83 Similarly, draft
guideline 10bis on incorporation of a state into another state provides: “When an internationally
wrongful act has been committed by a State prior to its incorporation into another State, the injured
State and the incorporating State should agree on how to address the injury.”84 Draft guideline 11
on “Dissolution of a State” provides some guidance as to how an agreement should be reached:
When a State that has committed an internationally wrongful act dissolves and
ceases to exist and the parts of the territory of the predecessor State form two or more
successor States, the injured State and the relevant successor State or States should agree
on how to address the injury arising from the internationally wrongful act. They should
78

For discussion of prior work on this topic, see Murphy, Sixty-Ninth Session, supra note 4, at 990–92; Murphy,
Seventieth Session, supra note 4, at 104–06; Murphy, Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, at 78–81; Seventy-Second
Session, supra note 60, at 679–81.
79
See International Law Commission, Fifth Report on Succession of States in Respect of State Responsibility,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/751, at 8–19, paras. 23–63 (Apr. 1, 2022) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Pavel Šturma).
80
Id. at 29–34, annex III.
81
2022 Report, supra note 1, at 290, para. 86.
82
Id. at 287, para. 75.
83
Id. at 293 (draft guideline 10).
84
Id. at 293 (draft guideline 10bis, para. 1).
12

take into account any territorial link, any benefit derived, any equitable apportionment, and
all other relevant circumstances.85
While there was considerable discussion in the drafting committee on how best to address
the issue of a state’s diplomatic protection of its nationals in the context of a succession of states,
draft guideline 15 as provisionally adopted simply says: “The present draft guidelines do not
address the application of the rules of diplomatic protection in situations of the succession of
States.”86
At its next session, the Commission will need to decide how best to proceed with this topic,
with the most likely options being: (1) appointing a new special rapporteur charged with
completing the topic as a set of draft guidelines with commentary;87 (2) establishing a working
group charged with preparing a final report on the topic, which would draw upon the prior work;88
or (3) terminating the topic without the completion of a final product.89
C. General Principles of Law
In 2018, the Commission moved the topic of general principles of law onto the current
program of work and appointed Marcelo Vázquez-Bermúdez (Ecuador) as special rapporteur.90
This topic is analyzing the third source of international law, as reflected in ICJ Statute Article
38(1)(c): “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”91 At the seventy-third
session, the Commission had before it the third report of the special rapporteur, in which he
proposed five new draft conclusions.92
In his report, the special rapporteur proposed that the Commission seek to conclude a first
reading of the topic at the current session.93 The drafting committee completed work on all of the
special rapporteur’s proposals (resulting in a total of eleven draft conclusions), such that, with
sufficient time, a first reading might have been possible. However, there was insufficient time to
complete work on all of the commentary to these draft conclusions, such that a first reading will
likely occur instead at the seventy-fourth session.
The Commission adopted draft conclusion 5, which focused on how to determine whether
a general principle of law is common to the various legal systems of the world. It provides:
1.
To determine the existence of a principle common to the various legal systems of
the world, a comparative analysis of national legal systems is required.
85
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2.
The comparative analysis must be wide and representative, including the different
regions of the world.
3.
The comparative analysis includes an assessment of national laws and decisions of
national courts, and other relevant materials.94
The commentary to paragraph 2 indicates that it “is aimed at clarifying that, while it is not
necessary to assess every single legal system of the world to identify a general principle of law,
the comparative analysis must nonetheless be sufficiently comprehensive to take into account the
legal systems of States in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality of States.”95 Once
that determination is made, a second step is required; draft conclusion 6 (as adopted within the
drafting committee) provides that a “principle common to the various legal systems of the world
may be transposed to the international legal system in so far as it is compatible with that system.”96
The principal issue addressed at the seventy-third session, however, was whether general
principles of law comprise not just those derived from national legal systems, but also those that
“may be formed within the international legal system.” The Commission decided in draft
conclusion 3 that the latter was possible,97 though the term “may” introduces some ambiguity as
to whether such principles exist. The commentary candidly notes that while the existence of such
principles “appears to find support in the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals and teachings,”
some members considered “that Article 38, paragraph 1(c), does not encompass a second category
of general principles of law, or at least remain sceptical of its existence as an autonomous source
of international law.”98
Assuming that general principles can be formed within the international legal system, draft
conclusion 7 seeks to indicate how they might be identified. It provides:
1.
To determine the existence and content of a general principle of law that may be
formed within the international legal system, it is necessary to ascertain that the community
of nations has recognized the principle as intrinsic to the international legal system.
2.
Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the question of the possible existence of other
general principles of law formed within the international legal system.99
Thus, paragraph 1 indicates a relatively narrow scope for general principles of law that are
formed within the international legal system—they must be recognized as “intrinsic” to that
system—while paragraph 2 leaves open the door to other possibilities. As to what is meant by
“intrinsic,” the commentary observes that “the international legal system, like any other legal
system, must be able to generate general principles of law that are intrinsic to it, which may reflect
and regulate its basic features, and not have only general principles of law borrowed from other
legal systems.” 100 Yet the Commission was unable to agree on any specific example of such
94
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general principles, even among members who believed they existed. The most that could be agreed
upon in the commentary was that certain examples were “referred to by members of the
Commission during the debates,” such as the principle of sovereign equality of states, the principle
of territorial integrity, the principle of uti possidetis juris, and the principle of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of another state.101
The remaining draft conclusions adopted in the drafting committee (but not yet by the
Commission) are on decisions of courts and tribunals (draft conclusion 8); teachings (draft
conclusion 9); functions of general principles of law (draft conclusion 10); and the relationship
between general principles of law and treaties and customary international law (draft conclusion
11). Of particular interest, draft conclusion 10 says that “[g]eneral principles of law are mainly
resorted to when other rules of international law do not resolve a particular issue in whole or in
part,” but also “contribute to the coherence of the international law system,” such as by serving
“to interpret and complement other rules of international law” and “as a basis for primary rights
and obligations, as well as a basis for secondary and procedural rules.”102 Draft conclusion 11
states that “[g]eneral principles of law, as a source of international law, are not in a hierarchical
relationship with treaties and customary international law,” and indeed may exist in parallel with
them.103 Further, any conflict as between such principles and rules “is to be resolved by applying
the generally accepted techniques of interpretation and conflict resolution in international law.”104
D. Sea-Level Rise in Relation to International Law
At the seventy-first session, the Commission placed on its current program of work the
topic of sea-level rise in relation to international law, to be addressed in the context of a study
group, which is open to all members.105 The topic was proposed by a group of ILC members who
are serving as co-chairs of the study group: Bogdan Aurescu (Romania); Yacouba Cissé (Côte
d’Ivoire); Patricia Galvão Teles (Portugal); Nilüfer Oral (Turkey); and Juan José Ruda Santolaria
(Peru).
For the present session, it was decided that the study group would focus on issues relating
to statehood and protection of persons in relation to sea-level rise. Consequently, two of the cochairs (Galvão Teles and Ruda Santolaria) prepared a “second issues paper,” which served as the
basis for the study group’s work.106 While the study group discussed the second issues paper, there
was no specific outcome of that discussion.107 Rather, issues for further work were identified.108
The study group is expected to be reconvened during the next quinquennium. To assist in
the study group’s work, the Commission has requested information from states on their practice,
treaties, national laws, and court decisions relating to these topics.109
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IV. NEW TOPICS FOR THE AGENDA AND LONG-TERM WORK PROGRAM
During the seventy-third session, the Commission placed three new topics on its agenda
and requested information from states on each of them.110 First, the Commission added a topic on
settlement of international disputes to which international organizations are parties, and appointed
August Reinisch (Austria) as special rapporteur. The syllabus for this topic, originally adopted in
2016, provided that it covered disputes between an international organization and a state, as well
as a dispute between two international organizations. 111 Left uncertain was whether the topic
would also address disputes between private persons and international organizations, such as the
claims brought by Haitian nationals against the United Nations for the outbreak of cholera in Haiti
in 2010 reportedly attributable to the presence of UN peacekeepers. 112 When proposing the
addition of the topic to the Commission’s current program of work, the Commission’s chair
recalled paragraph 3 of the syllabus, which stated that “[i]t would be for future decision whether
certain disputes of a private law character, such as those arising under a contract or out of a tortious
act by or against an international organization, might also be covered.”113 The Commission’s 2022
report then states that, “[c]onsidering the importance of such disputes for the functioning of
international organizations in practice, it was presumed that the Special Rapporteur and the
Commission would take such disputes into account.”114
Second, the Commission added a topic to its agenda on prevention and repression of piracy
and armed robbery at sea, and appointed Yacouba Cissé (Côte d’Ivoire) as special rapporteur. 115
The syllabus for this topic, adopted in 2019, indicates that it will address inter alia the definition
of piracy, cooperation in its suppression, and the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of piracy.116
Third, the Commission added a topic to its agenda on subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of international law, with Charles Chernor Jalloh (Sierra Leone) as special
rapporteur.117 This topic, the syllabus for which was adopted in 2019,118 may be seen in the context
of the Commission’s recent treatment of various sources of international law, including customary
international law and general principles of law. Consistent with ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(d), this
topic will explore “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”119
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The Commission also added to its long-term work programme a new topic on non-legally
binding international agreements.120 The syllabus for this topic, developed by Mathias Forteau
(France), notes that “the practice of non-legally binding international agreements has considerably
grown and has become more complex and diversified in the last decades; it is therefore the subject
of increased attention and of significant concern, in the literature and in State practice.”121 This
topic would focus on two types of issues: (1) identifying criteria that distinguish, under
international law, non-legally binding agreements from legally binding agreements; and (2) the
potential legal effects of non-legally binding agreements, whether direct (such as when applying a
principle of good faith) or indirect (such as a form of waiver).122
V. POSSIBLE TRUST FUND TO ASSIST ILC SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND STUDY GROUP CHAIRS
While members of the Commission are reimbursed for their travel to the ILC’s sessions,
they receive no salary or other funding for their work. As such, special rapporteurs and study group
chairs, particularly those from developing regions, have been limited in their ability to engage in
research and interaction with relevant actors, since no funding is provided to them for those
purposes.
At prior sessions, the Commission proposed that consideration be given to the
establishment of a Trust Fund to support special rapporteurs and related matters.123 The General
Assembly took note of the proposal in 2021 and requested further information.124 Consequently,
the Commission attached to its 2022 report an annex that explains the need for such a trust fund,
with an appendix containing proposed terms of reference.125
VI. NEW QUINQUENNIUM 2023-2027
Due to the <10>COVID-19<10> pandemic and the ILC’s inability to meet in the summer
of 2020, the terms of the current members were extended for one year, so as to allow for the
completion of five sessions during the present term.126 Consequently, the quinquennium that was
intended to last for five years from 2017 to 2021 actually ended in 2022 with the seventy-third
session. At the same time, the election of membership for the next quinquennium proceeded as
originally scheduled in November 2021, rather than in late 2022. This meant that, during the
seventy-third session in 2022, it was already known which existing members who had stood for
reelection would be returning (and which would not), as well as which persons would be joining
the Commission in 2023 as new members. That knowledge undoubtedly played a part in the
Commission’s efforts to complete as much of its work as possible (for example, it was known that
two special rapporteurs who had sought reelection did not prevail) and a part in choosing and
assigning special rapporteurs for three new topics.
There will be 18 new members in the Commission during the next quinquennium, which
is a greater turnover than usual. In its new composition the Commission will regrettably continue
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to have only a few female members. Unfortunately, the candidate nominated by the United States
was not elected to the Commission, such that there will be no U.S. member (absent a vacancy) on
the Commission for the next five years.127 The lack of a U.S. member also occurred during the
ILC quinquennium that lasted from 2007 to 2011.
VII. REFLECTIONS ON THE ILC AS AN INSTITUTION
A decade of service on the ILC prompts a few reflections on its significance as an
institution and on its output. While many have noted that the Commission is less oriented toward
adoption of instruments intended to serve as treaties, the Commission is not entirely out of the
treaty business. The draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters (completed
in 2016) is now the subject of a process that may lead to the negotiation of a convention,128 and
the same may soon occur with respect to the draft articles on prevention and punishment of crimes
against humanity (2019). As previously noted, the draft articles on immunity of state officials
from foreign criminal jurisdiction, when completed at second reading, seem best considered as a
proposal for a new convention. Thus, the ILC remains a forum where nongovernmental, globallyrepresentative experts are able to craft proto-conventions in a relatively apolitical environment—
a valuable option given the considerable difficulties at present for the successful conclusion of
multilateral treaties.129
Having said that, and given the difficulties in treaty adoption, the Commission today sees
its relevance as best served mostly by producing instruments that are not intended to serve as
treaties. While that instinct is understandable, it means that many recent ILC instruments, cast as
“conclusions,” “guidelines,” “principles,” or in some other way, ultimately have no clear
imprimatur of acceptance or rejection by states; instead, one must assess closely the Commission’s
commentary to discern whether a stated rule is well-grounded in practice and case law, as well as
assess carefully the reactions by states in the Sixth Committee (which unfortunately is often
limited, unclear or conflicting). The risk for the Commission is that, if it regularly advances rules
that are not lex lata, while at the same time not expressly identifying them as lex ferenda, the ILC
may be perceived as now in the business of issuing ipse dixits (i.e., the law is what I say it is),
which over time will undermine its authority.
As for the topics pursued by the ILC, it is unfortunate that the Commission receives little
direction from within the General Assembly on topic selection, and rarely receives proposals from
individual states or international organizations; therefore, the Commission itself identifies topics
believed worthy of study. With an eye to the existence of many institutions in specialized areas
that are better equipped to develop complex instruments in those areas (e.g., trade, intellectual
property, environmental, or health), and to the fact that many issues may be best pursued at a
regional or bilateral level,130 ILC topic selection has largely trod three paths in recent years.
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First, the Commission has worked on topics that address the very nature of international
law, such as draft conclusions on identification of customary international law (2018) and on
identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens) (2022). Its current work on general principles of law and on subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of international law may be seen in this light, as well as possible future work
on non-legally binding international agreements. Second, the Commission has revisited its prior
work with a view to providing deeper insights, such as its draft conclusions on subsequent
agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties (2018) or the guide
to provisional application of treaties (2021) (both a revisiting of its work on the law of treaties that
led to the VCLT), as well as the final report of the study group on the most-favoured nation clause
(2015) (a revisiting of its 1978 draft articles on this topic). The new topic on prevention and
repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea revisits an aspect of the Commission’s seminal work
on the law of the sea. Third, the Commission has pursued topics that cut across subject matter
areas so as to promote systemic integration, such as its draft guidelines on the protection of the
atmosphere (2021) or draft principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed
conflicts (2022). Such work might be seen as in the spirit of the oft-cited conclusions and report
on the fragmentation of international law (2006).131
All these topics have garnered considerable attention by states, international organizations
and others, such that the Commission’s continuing contribution to the understanding and
development of international law is self-evident. One might even regard the Commission “as a
guardian of the systemic nature of international law,” serving as a central organ for strengthening
the rule of law in international affairs.132 Whether it can maintain that status likely turns on the
degree to which the Commission stays attuned to the practice and desires of states and eschews
any grander vision of assuming the mantle of legislator of international law.
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